Thank you, Kevin. We tested com.apple.security.files.user-selected.executable in a matched, Development-signed sandbox comparison on macOS 27.0. With our original entitlements, exact raw and public quarantine metadata preservation failed in all 6 attempts. Adding only this entitlement produced exact matches in all 6 attempts across fclonefileat, copyfile, and FileManager.copyItem. We then added the entitlement to Filery and verified its normal UI Copy/Paste path on local APFS. The file bytes and SHA-256, complete raw com.apple.quarantine value, and fresh NSURL.quarantinePropertiesKey dictionary all matched the source. This resolves the issue for our measured case while retaining App Sandbox and user-granted folder access. We’ll separately verify the final Mac App Store archive’s effective entitlements and broader filesystem cases. Thank you for pointing us to the supported entitlement.