We have an application with multiple extension targets. We generate device check token using DCDevice.current.generateToken API. However while trying to validate the device using devicecheck.apple.com/v1/validate_device_token from our servers, we get success for our extension targets but failure for our app target. The transaction IDs are below For App target's device check token: 26050657-fa98-4d2e-8e28-eb0e4005cf15 For extension target's device check token: cfab83e0-8aa7-43e7-8343-f8baaec6ee651001 We assume this is because our main target has a different APPID prefix compared to our extension targets. Device validation API should not fail because the code signing is done from the same developer ID. Can you check on this? Or Can we use the device verify token from our extension targets for validating the app since extension targets are a bundled with app target by design?

Are there any plans to increase the DC token validity or enable using attestations to set the device check bit states? The current implementation makes it challenging to set bit states once we identify a device as belong to a bad actor after the fact. We need to actor to re-engage with the platform to be able to collect a DC token which mostly doesnt happen since they use burner accounts and move on.

Hi App Attest team, I was nodding along happily in the wwdc session, because it was seeming like an air tight solution to prevent API abuse while allowing "guest" access (e.g. not enforcing that users log in). Then I hit this line, "a compromised device can still pass attestations". How is that possible? Earlier in the session, the presenter said "[AppAttest] gives you the assurance that your app is running on a secure apple device". I'm trying to square these statements and understand the motivation of the 'fraud metric'. Thank you! Lou Ps. I'm so happy that AppAttest is available on Mac now. :D

The wwdc session mentioned that attestation keys survive app updates but not reinstalls. So it seems like if I try to create an assertion after reinstall from the key I pull from keychain, and include that assertion in my API payload to my backend, my backend will reject the assertion. Is there any mechanism for us to ask the client framework "is this key still valid"? Thanks again, Lou

My understanding from the App Attest wwdc session is that we store attestation keys in keychain on a per-user basis. For apps that don't require user login, I'm thinking of using StoreKit's AppTransactionID [1] as the identifier to discriminate keys. Do you have opinions on whether this is a valid pattern? [1] https://developer.apple.com/documentation/storekit/apptransaction/apptransactionid

Apple has provided a number of Swift Packages for backend development, including some new tools for wallet passes! Is there anything like this for attestation and device check capabilities for a swift-on-server product to consume? If not, consider this a placeholder for a future feedback request.

Hi! I have not seen this year's video yet, so please forgive me if this is answered. I notice a couple of folks here saying that AppAttest is (at least partially) supported on macOS 27. Is this correct? My specific use case is a "designed for iPad" app running on macOS. We use App Attest to make high-value requests to our headend services and would really like this to work on macOS as well.

Since device check APIs (attestation) are not available for extensions like share extension and widget extension (at least in 26 and according to documentation still in 27) - is there any best practice how to still protect endpoints which are also called from these extensions? And subquestion: is there a technical limitation in iOS design that made it impossible to also support extensions.